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Abstract
We introduce a protocol for quantum secret sharing based on reusable entan-
gled states. The entangled state between the sender and the receiver acts only as
a carrier to which data bits are entangled by the sender and disentangled from it
by the receivers, all by local actions of simple gates. We also show that the inter-
ception by Eve or the cheating of one of the receivers introduces a quantum bit
error rate (QBER) larger than 25 percent which can be detected by comparing
a subsequence of the bits.
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1 Introduction
The past few years has witnessed progress in theoretical aspects and experimental
implementations of quantum cryptography. (For an elementary introduction to the
subject see [1] and for a comprehensive review of recent advances see [2].)
One of the desirable protocols for secure communication is called secret sharing, the
simplest of which is when the sender Alice wants to send a secret message to two
receivers Bob and Charlie so that non of the receivers can recover the message on his
own. In 1998, Hillery, Buzek, and Berthiaume proposed a quantum solution for secret
sharing [3]. In their method which is inspired by the quantum key distribution method
of Bennett and Brasard [4], and Ekert[5], Alice, Bob and Charlie share a Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [6]. They then carry out measurements of their bits in
either of the two non-commuting bases, say x and y bases in random. Since the results
or measurements are correlated for half of the cases, they can establish a secret key
between themselves by announcing their bases of measurements. The aim of the
present article which is inspired by the work of Zhang, Li and Guo [7] in quantum key
distribution, is to present an alternative method for secret sharing, which is based on
sharing entangled states as carriers to which data bits are entangled by the sender
Alice and disentangled by the receivers Bob and Charlie. The role of this carrier is to
make communication secure against intervention of evesdroppers or cheating of any
of the receivers.
Two remarks are in order comparing the differences of our protocols with the known
ones [3, 8].
1- If experimental realization of constructing and distributing GHZ states to parties
at long separation becomes a possibility in the future, it is plausible to assume that
the maintenance of the correlations of these states will be easier and less costly than
their creation anew for every round as is needed in earlier protocols for secret sharing.
2- We should also point out that this protocol is not far from the reach of the near
future experiments. At present single qubit gates and double qubit gates very close
to the CNOT gate, can be implemented on individual ions where up to ten ions are
kept in a coherent state [9]. One can also imagine that by methods similar to the ones
proposed in [10], distant atoms or ions can be entangled with each other in the near
future. The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 2 we introduce the protocol
for two receiving parties, and discuss how information is split and is protected from
unauthorized parties. We also show how intervention of Eve can be detected. We end
up the paper with conclusions.
2 The secret sharing protocol with two parties
Suppose Alice wants to sent a message which is already in the form of a sequence of
classical bits q1, q2, q3, · · ·, (qi = 0 or 1) to Bob and Charlie, so that the receivers
can infer this message only by their mutual assistance. We begin with our notations.
We use subscripts a, b, c and e on states and operators for Alice, Bob, Charlie, and
Eve respectively. Any other space carrying message qubits is specified by numerical
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subscripts, 1, 2, etc. A controlled gate like CNOT is denoted simply by C, and is
specified by two subscripts, the first one is the control bit, the second is the target
bit. Thus Ca1 is the controlled NOT gate which is controlled by Alice qubit and acts
on the qubit in line 1, i.e: Ca1|q, q′〉a1 = |q, q + q′〉a1, where q and q′ are 0 and 1 and
addition is performed mod two.
The Hadamard gate acts as H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). By |0〉
and |1〉, we mean two qubit states which are uniform superposition of basis states the
sum of whose digits modulo 2 are respectively 0 and 1, i.e: |0〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉)
and |1〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 1〉 + |1, 0〉), which can be identified only by the collaboration of the
two parties possessing the bits.
Moreover the following property is also easily verified:
Ca1Cb2|q〉a,b|q′〉1,2 = |q〉a,b|q + q′〉1,2. (1)
We also need to define two three-particle states, namely the GHZ state which we
denote by
|G〉 := 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉). (2)
and an even parity state which we denote by
|E〉 := 1
2
(|000〉 + |110〉 + |101〉 + |011〉) ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉). (3)
These two states are transformed to each other by the local operation of Hadamard
gates, that is:
|G〉 = H ⊗H ⊗H|E〉 and |E〉 = H ⊗H ⊗H|G〉 (4)
We will use these two states which are shared by all three parties, as carriers of
information, (the |G〉 state in the odd rounds and the |E〉 state in the even rounds).
Alice entangles her data bits to the above carriers and bob and Charlie disentangle
the data bits from these carriers. Due to property (4), the action of Hadamard gates
performed by all the parties at the end of each round switches the Carrier to the
appropriate one for the next round. This switching of carriers is also crucial for the
security of the protocol as we will see in the sequel.
For sending a classical bit q Alice may encode it as a state |q, q〉 and send this state
simply to Bob and Charlie. At the destination Bob and Charlie can measure their
corresponding bits and recover the bit q. In this case Bob and Charlie can understand
q without each other’s assistance, and in fact Alice sends half of the bits say the odd
numbered ones q1, q3, q5 · · · in this way. For the other half, q2, q4, q6 · · ·, she encodes a
bit q in the form of a state |q〉 = 1√
2
(|0, q〉+ |1, q+1〉) and sends it to Bob and Charlie
who are assumed to have access to the first and second spaces respectively. Any such
state gives no information at all to either Bob or Charlie, since the density matrix of
each of them is easily seen to be completely mixed. However they can identify the bit
q by communicating to each other the result of their measurements. The value of the
bit q is simply obtained by adding their result mod 2. In this way Alice can split a
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message so that Bob and Charlie can recover the message only by their cooperation.
A cheating of the kind of wrong declaration of the results by one of the receivers leads
to 50 percent errors which is easily detected by comparing a subsequence of the bits
received with those actually sent by Alice. By this comparison Alice finds that at
least one of the receivers has been dishonest. Although she can not determine which
one.
This is the part of protocol which deals with splitting of information. Now we are
faced with the problem of protecting information against Eavesdropping and against
cheating of one of the parties who may find access via the collaboration of Eve to
both the qubits.
We should assume that the quantum channel used by Alice for sending the qubits is
not secure and can be penetrated by an unauthorized third party called Eve (who
incidentally may be one of the dishonest receivers say Bob) finding access to both of
the bits in transition and retrieving the data (without assistance of Charlie). We now
make our protocol safe against such attacks or cheating. The strategy is to entangle
the message qubits with an already entangled state in possession of Alice, Bob and
Charlie, in a highly mixed form, so that while being sent, these qubits if accessed
by Eve or by one of the receivers say Bob, carry no information at all. Moreover we
should also show that Eve’s intervention and Bob’s cheating can be detected by the
other parties. We use two different forms of carriers for odd and even bits. For odd
bits, we proceed as follows. Alice entangles the state |qq〉12 to the already present
GHZ state |G〉abc by performing CNOT gates Ca1Ca2 on
|G〉abc|qq〉12 = 1√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉 + |1, 1, 1〉)a,b,c|q, q〉12 (5)
to produce the state:
|Φodd〉 = 1√
2
(
|0, 0, 0〉abc|q, q〉12 + |1, 1, 1〉a,b,c|1 + q, 1 + q〉12
)
(6)
At the destination, Bob and Charlie act on this state by the operators Cb1 and Cc2
and extract the state |q, q〉1,2 where each one of them can read independently his
own bit. By her action Alice has entangled the double bit |q, q〉1,2 so that while in
transmission it is a mixture of |q, q〉 and |1 + q, 1 + q〉 which conveys no information
to Eve about the value of the bit being sent.
It is also seen from the state (6) that a simple intercept-resend strategy adopted by
Eve of the two flying data qubits, will make 50 percent error in the data bits jointly
received by Bob and Charlie with those sent by Alice. Therefore Eve’s presence can
be detected by publicly comparing a subsequence of the bits sent by Alice with those
received by Bob and Charlie.
For the even bits which are encoded as states |q〉, i.e. (|0¯〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) and
|1¯〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)), Alice entangles this state to the carrier |E〉 by performing only
one single CNOT gate Ca1 on
|E〉abc ⊗ |q〉12 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉)abc|q〉1,2 (7)
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to produce the state
|Ψeven〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉a|0〉bc|q〉12 + |1〉a|1〉bc|1 + q〉12
)
(8)
where we have used the the property (1). At the destination, Bob and Charlie act on
this state by the operators Cb1 and Cc2 where again by (1) they extract |q〉1,2 which
they can identify completely only by their collaboration. It is quite simple to see from
(8) that ρb1 = ρc2 = ρ12 =
1
2
I.
This means that neither Eve alone who may supposedly find access to the two
data bits nor any of the receivers independently, can find the data bit which has
been encoded and sent by Alice. For the even rounds the simple intercept-resend
strategy of Eve introduces 50 percent discrepancy among the data bits of Bob with
those of Charlie which again leads to the detection of Eve, since a state which has
been encoded as |0¯〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) is received half the time by Bob and Charlie
as a state |1¯〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉).
Note that once the data bits are measured by Bob and Charlie, only one of them
needs to publicly announce the result of his measurement, and the other will find
the actual bit sent by Alice, by simply adding the bit publicly announced to the one
that he has actually measured. This public announcement again does not convey any
information to Eve. Moreover a wrong declaration of results by one of the receivers
say Bob again leads to discrepancies of the bits between Alice and Charlie.
Before going on to study a general attack of Eve or Cheating of Bob, lets finish the
protocol by saying how Alice, Bob and Charlie switch their entangled state from the
GHZ state |G〉a,b,c for odd rounds to the even state |E〉a,b,c state for even rounds.
They can do this simply by performing Hadamard gates on their respective states at
the end of every round of the protocol. The reason is relation (1). Thus they start
the first round with the GHZ state |G〉 and end up with the |E〉 state which is used
for the second round. At the end of the second round they have produced again the
GHZ state |G〉 which will be used for the next round and so on.
We now assume that Eve who may be a collaborator of one of the receivers say Bob
follows a more complicated strategy by entangling her system (ancilla) with the states
of Alice, Bob and Charlie in the most general form, that is:
|Θ〉a,b,c,e =
∑
i,j,k
|i, j, k〉abc ⊗ ηijk i, j, k = 0, 1. (9)
where ηi,j,k’s are un-normalized states of Eve. Eve wants to make this entanglement so
that at the end of each round of sending and receiving a bit, useful information about
that bit is collected in her ancilla which she can measure safely later on. Consider
an odd round of the process and suppose that the starting state of Alice, Bob and
Charlie, ignorant of the presence of Eve is as above. Eve is clever enough to entangle
her state such that she does not perturb the values of the final bits measured by
Bob and Charlie when the protocol is run for this round. (otherwise a comparison
of a substring of bits between Alice and Bob and Charlie, will reveal her presence or
her collaboration with one of the receivers.). She then finds that the ideal form of
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entanglement is as follows:
|Θodd〉 = |0, 0, 0〉η000 + |1, 1, 1〉η111 . (10)
where we have suppressed the subscripts on the states and the ⊗ symbol. If she keeps
any other state in (10), say a state like |0, 1, 1〉η011 , the total superposition will have
a term |0, 1, 1, q, q〉η011 which reveals the encoded bit q by Alice as 1 + q to Bob and
Charlie. Or if she keeps a state like |0, 1, 0〉η010 , the total superposition will have a
term |0, 1, 0, q, q〉η011 which reveals the encoded bit q by Alice as 1+ q to Bob and as
q to Charlie. In all cases these lead to her detection after a subsequence of bits are
compared. A similar analysis reveals to Eve that the ideal form of entanglement for
an even round of the protocol is:
|Θeven〉 = |0, 0, 0〉ξ000 + |1, 1, 0〉ξ110 + |1, 0, 1〉ξ101 + |0, 1, 1〉ξ011 (11)
The crucial point is that the Hadamard gates at the end of each round do not allow Eve
to have desirable entanglement for every round. Eve can have desirable entanglement
only if H⊗3|Θeven〉 = |Θodd〉 and vise versa. A simple calculation yields:
H⊗3|Θodd〉 = 1
2
√
2
(|0, 0, 0〉 + |110〉 + |1, 0, 1〉 + |011〉)(η000 + η111)
+ 1
2
√
2
(|1, 1, 1〉 + |0, 0, 1〉 + |010〉 + |100〉)(η000 − η111). (12)
Equating this to |Θeven〉 yeilds η000 = η111 and ξ000 = ξ110 = ξ101 = ξ011. Looking
back at (10) and (11), we see that this implies that this switching between desirable
entanglement at alternative rounds is possible for Eve only if there is no entanglement
at all in any of the rounds! One may argue that Eve may not want to completely avoid
any error introduced into the data and she may entangle her system to the carriers
in order to reduce the quantum bit error rate (QBER) as low as possible, lower than
the expected level of noise and hence escape the detection . We will show in the
appendix, that Eve can not lower the QBER averaged over odd and even rounds,
below 25 percent. In this way we have shown the security of the protocol against
Eve’s attack or Bob’s Cheating.
In conclusion we have presented a new protocol for quantum secret sharing based on
reusable entangled states. In our protocol a sequence of bits is transmitted to two
parties so that they can recover half of the bits independently and for the rest half
they need to collaborate to find the identity of the bits. The distinctive feature of this
protocol is the existence of a carrier which carries the data bits from the sender to
the receiver in secure form, without any need for measurements in random bases and
public announcements. We have also discussed the security of the protocol against
evesdropping and against cheating of one of the receivers, and have shown that any
such action leads to high error rates in the sequence of bits between the participants.
A rigorous proof of the security of the protocol is however beyond the scope of the
present work.
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3 Appendix
This appendix is a completion of section 3, where we show that even if we Eve allows
a small quantum bit error rate introduced into the data, she can not find any form of
entanglement of her system to the carriers to achieve this goal. Suppose that in the
odd and even rounds Eve entangles her system to the carriers in the following general
forms:
|Θodd〉 = |0〉η0 + |1〉η1 + |2〉η2 + |3〉η3 + |4〉η4 + |5〉η5 + |6〉η6 + |7〉η7. (13)
and
|Θeven〉 = |0〉ξ0 + |1〉ξ1 + |2〉ξ2 + |3〉ξ3 + |4〉ξ4 + |5〉ξ5 + |6〉ξ6 + |7〉ξ7. (14)
where for simplicity we have used binary notation and suppressed indices, i.e. |0〉ξ0 ≡
|000〉abc ⊗ ξ0, |3〉ξ3 ≡ |011〉abc ⊗ ξ3 etc. In order to reduce the QBER (the probability
of unwanted bits introduced into the transferred bits) below a tolerable threshold ǫ,
she should choose the states such that:
|η1|2 + |η2|2 + |η3|2 + |η4|2 + |η5|2 + |η6|2 ≤ ǫ, or |η0|2 + |η7|2 ≥ 1− ǫ (15)
in the odd rounds and
|ξ1|2 + |ξ2|2 + |ξ4|2 + |ξ7|2 ≤ ǫ. (16)
However the action of Hadamard gates relates the two states |Θodd〉 and |Θeven〉 and
hence the states {ηi} and {ξi}. It is easy to find that under the Hadamard operations:
ξ1 =
1
2
√
2
(η0 + η1 − η2 − η3 − η4 − η5 + η6 + η7)
ξ2 =
1
2
√
2
(η0 − η1 + η2 − η3 − η4 + η5 − η6 + η7)
ξ4 =
1
2
√
2
(η0 + η1 + η2 + η3 − η4 − η5 − η6 − η7)
ξ7 =
1
2
√
2
(η0 − η1 − η2 + η3 − η4 + η5 + η6 − η7) (17)
A simple rearrangement yields
|ξ1|2 + |ξ2|2 + |ξ4|2 + |ξ7|2 =
1
2
(|η0 − η4|2 + |η1 − η5|2 + |η2 − η6|2 + |η3 − η7|2)
≥ 1
2
(|η0 − η4|2 + |η3 − η7|2) ≃ 1− ǫ
2
(18)
where in the last line we have used (15). Therefore we see that keeping the QBER
below a very small threshold ǫ in the odd rounds, will introduce a QBER of about 50
percent in the even rounds and vice versa. The average QBER over the odd and even
rounds is 1
2
(ǫ+ 1−ǫ
2
) = 1+ǫ
4
and the best that Eve can do is to minimize this average
to 25 percent by minimizing ǫ.
7
4 References
1. I. V. Volovich and Ya. I. Volovich, On classical and quantum cryptography,
quant-ph/0108133.
2. N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel and H. Zbinden; Quantum Cryptography, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
3. M. Hillery, V. Buzek and A. Berthiaume; Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999).
4. C. H. Bennet and G. Brassard, in Proceeding of the IEEE International Con-
ference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Banglore, India, 1984
(IEEE, New York, 1984), p. 175.
5. A. K. Ekert; Phys. Rev. Lett.,67, 661(1991).
6. D. M. Greenberger, M. A. Horne, and A. Zeilinger; Bell’s theorem, Quantum
Theory and The Conceptions of The Universe (M. Kafatos, ed. Kluwer Aca-
demic, Dor-drecht, the Netherlands, 1989).
7. Y. S. Zhang, C. F. Li, and G. C. Guo; Phys. Rev. A, 64, 024302 (2001).
8. A. Karlsson, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto; Phys. Rev. A 59, No. 1, 162 (1999).
9. D. Leibfried et al. Experiments towards quantum information with trapped
Calcium ions; quant-ph/0009105
10. C. Cabrillo, J. I. Cirac, P. Garca-Fernndez, and P. Zoller Phys. Rev. A 59,
1025 (1999).
8
